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Abstract 
 In terms of section 129(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
(NCA), a credit provider first needs to provide a consumer with 
notice of his default and a list of possible remedies to overcome 
the default, before enforcing the agreement in a court of law. 
This ensures that the consumer is given the opportunity to 
remedy his default by, for example, undergoing debt counselling 
instead of having to incur legal costs when defending legal 
action brought against him by the credit provider. Before the 
National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 came into operation, 
the NCA neglected to specify how this notice should be delivered 
to consumers, and this has led to various conflicting decisions. 
The matter was eventually settled by the Constitutional Court in 
two separate cases. After the Constitutional Court pronounced 
on the matter, the National Credit Amendment Act came into 
operation prescribing the manner in which the notice must be 
delivered. Consumer-credit legislation that existed prior to the 
NCA coming into operation generally also made provision for 
similar notices to be delivered to consumers. In this article we 
briefly look at how the previous consumer-credit legislation dealt 
with the delivery of similar notices and also consider how the 
delivery of notices is currently governed by the NCA. Most of the 
problematic issues surrounding the delivery of the section 129(1) 
notice have been resolved, but some still remain. One such 
example is found in a recent Supreme Court of Appeal case, 
where despite the correct delivery of the notice to the consumer, 
the notice caused unintended jurisdictional problems for a credit 
provider trying to enforce the credit agreement. 
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1 Introduction 
Previous consumer-credit legislation1 left defaulting consumers largely at 
the mercy of credit providers and provided very little protection for them. In 
this light the Legislature saw fit to introduce new consumer-credit legislation 
in the form of the National Credit Act (NCA).2 From the NCA's preamble and 
section 3 of the Act, it is clear that one of the core objectives of the Act is to 
provide greater consumer protection.3 Chapter 6 of the NCA entitled 
"Collection, Repayment, Surrender and Debt Enforcement" gives effect to 
the objectives of the Act by stipulating the procedures that a credit provider 
must follow should he4 wish to terminate or enforce a credit agreement.  
Section 129 of the NCA, which is set out in Chapter 6, was one of the 
measures specifically put into place by the legislature to enhance consumer 
protection. Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA provides that if a consumer 
(debtor) is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider may send 
a default notice to the consumer, and if he does, he must draw the 
consumer's attention to the fact that he has a right to use various alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms (for example, he may ask for the assistance 
of a debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or 
ombud with jurisdiction), before the credit provider may institute legal court 
proceedings. This notice serves not only to inform the consumer of his 
default, but also proposes that the consumer refer the credit agreement to 
a debt counsellor, alternate dispute resolution agent, consumer court or 
ombud with jurisdiction, so that the parties may resolve any dispute under 
the agreement, or a payment plan may be developed to ensure that the 
outstanding debt is paid. The aim of section 129(1)(a) "is to facilitate 
                                            
*  This article is based on a LLM dissertation completed under the supervision of 
Professor M Kelly-Louw at the University of South Africa (see Govender 
Interpretation of the Section 129(1)(a) Notice). 
**  Sarah Govender. LLB (UKZN), LLM (Unisa). Legal Officer and Attorney at the 
Department of Public Works in KwaZulu-Natal. The opinions expressed are my own 
and do not reflect the opinions of the Department of Public Works, KwaZulu-Natal. 
E-mail: govender.sarah2507@gmail.com. 
***  Michelle Kelly-Louw. BIuris LLB LLM LLD (Unisa), Dip Insolvency Law and Practice 
(UJ). Professor in the Department of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of 
South Africa. E-mail: kellym@unisa.ac.za. 
1  See the Usury Act 73 of 1968 (hereafter the Usury Act); Credit Agreements Act 75 
of 1980 (hereafter the Credit Agreements Act); Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942 
(hereafter the Hire-Purchase Act); and the Sale of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 
1971.  
2  National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter the NCA or the Act). 
3  See, eg Mostert v Firstrand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank 2018 4 SA 443 (SCA) para 
24. 
4  In this article words in the masculine gender also include the feminine.  
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consensual resolution of credit agreement disputes."5 Section 129(1) places 
a duty on the credit provider to inform the consumer of the possible 
assistance that is available before legal action will be instituted.6 In this 
regard, the NCA provides greater consumer protection than that offered by 
any of its predecessors7 (such as the Hire-Purchase Act and the Credit 
Agreements Act) or the Alienation of Land Act,8 in that it not only informs 
the consumer of his default and the amount in arrears, but also proposes 
alternative means to remedy it.  
A proper interpretation of section 129(1)(a) of the NCA is essential as it has 
far-reaching consequences for both the credit provider and the consumer. 
In terms of section 129(1), the credit provider is required to follow procedural 
requirements in terms of sections 129 and 130 of the NCA before instituting 
legal action to enforce or recover debt from a defaulting consumer. In terms 
of section 129(1)(b), until there has been compliance with the requirements 
of section 129(1)(a), a credit provider is barred from instituting legal 
proceedings against the defaulting consumer. 
Unfortunately, the sloppy and ambiguous drafting of section 129(1) has led 
to various problems regarding its correct interpretation. For instance, one of 
the hurdles that needed to be overcome in ensuring a correct interpretation 
of section 129 was determining whether or not compliance with section 
129(1)(a) was compulsory. The use of the word "may" in section 129(1)(a) 
tended to give the impression that a credit provider had a discretion and 
was not compelled to give a consumer written notice of his default. 
However, from other sections of the NCA, for example sections 129(1)(b), 
130(3)(a) and 130(4)(b), and from case law and legal arguments, it has 
since been settled that no legal proceedings can commence unless the 
prescribed notice is provided to a defaulting consumer.9 
                                            
5  Mostert v Firstrand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank 2018 4 SA 443 (SCA) para 24. See 
also Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) paras 40 and 
46; and Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 19-
23. 
6  See, eg Imperial Bank v Kubheka 2010 JDR 0077 (GNP). 
7  See the legislation listed in fn 1 above and see the discussion in para 2 below. 
8  See s 19 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 (hereafter the Alienation of Land 
Act) (for a discussion, see para 3 below).  
9  See Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 8; 
Moegemat v Nedbank Ltd (ECG) (unreported) case number CA39/2010 of 27 
October 2010; Nedbank Limited v Mokhonoana 2010 5 SA 551 (GNP); Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Rockhill 2010 5 SA 252 (GSJ) paras 17 and 18; 
Griekwaland-Wes Korporatief Limited v Jacobs (NCK) (unreported) case number 
1995/2010 of 5 August 2011 para 14; Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 22 and 24; and Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v 
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Another controversial topic which has been the focus of many judicial 
decisions since the incorporation of the NCA and which has been 
extensively debated, was how the peremptory section 129 notice was to be 
delivered to the consumer. Section 129 in its original format did not specify 
how the notice was to be delivered to the consumer. Section 129, prior to 
its amendment by the National Credit Amendment Act,10 simply stated that 
the credit provider had to draw the consumer's attention to the default 
notice, but it was not specific as to how this was to be done. For instance, 
the section did not specify whether the notice was to be hand-delivered, 
posted or sent via other means. It also did not specify whether or not the 
notice had to come to the actual attention of the consumer. This uncertainty 
led to some courts expressing the view that either actual knowledge and/or 
receipt of the notice by the consumer was required or that credit providers 
were compelled to do more than merely dispatch the notice.11 Other courts 
were of the view that the notice was valid if it had been properly dispatched 
and consequently that the credit provider would be regarded as having 
complied with the Act even if the consumer did not actually receive the 
notice.12 
This contentious issue of delivery of the notice was initially decided on by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd.13 The 
Constitutional Court later also made a ruling in respect of delivery of the 
notice in the case of Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.14 In the 
beginning it seemed that Sebola concluded this long-standing debate 
regarding the correct delivery of the section 129 notice, but unfortunately 
the decision only sparked a new debate and conflicting views arose in the 
different High Courts concerning instances where the notices sent via 
                                            
Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA) paras 17 and 18. For a detailed discussion of this 
issue, see Kelly-Louw 2015 SALJ 245.  
10  National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 (hereafter the National Credit 
Amendment Act). 
11  See judgments such as Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 
2 SA 512 (D); Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Van Vuuren 2009 5 SA 557 (T); 
Firstrand Bank Limited v Ngcobo 2009 ZAGPPHC 112 (11 September 2009); and 
Firstrand Bank Limited v Dhlamini 2010 4 SA 531 (GNP) para 31.  
12  Firstrand Bank v Bernado 2009 ZAECPEHC 19 (28 April 2009); Munien v BMW 
Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 549 (KZD) para 54; Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd v Mellet 2009 ZAFSHC 110 (30 October 2009); Starita v Absa Bank 
Ltd 2010 3 SA 443 (GSJ); First National Bank Ltd v Rossouw (GNP) (unreported) 
case number 30624/2009 of 6 August 2009; and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
v Rockhill 2010 5 SA 252 (GSJ). 
13  Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). 
14  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC). 
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registered mail were "returned to sender by the respective post offices."15 
These conflicting views, coupled with various ambiguous statements made 
in the Sebola case itself, eventually led to the matter again being discussed 
and considered by the Constitutional Court in the case of Kubyana v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.16 Generally, the latter Constitutional 
Court judgment properly interpreted what constituted compliant delivery 
under section 129 in its original format. 
During 2015 section 129 was amended by the National Credit Amendment 
Act. Three subsections17 were inserted into section 129 providing in short 
that a default notice is permitted to be delivered to a consumer either by 
registered mail or personally to an adult person at the location designated 
by the consumer and in the preferred manner of delivery indicated by the 
consumer in writing. With the amendment of section 129 by the National 
Credit Amendment Act, the Legislature aimed to clarify the confusion that 
arose regarding the issue of the delivery and receipt of the section 129(1)(a) 
notice.  
In this article brief attention is given to the manner in which default notices 
were delivered to defaulting consumers in terms of the different pieces of 
consumer-credit legislation that existed prior to the NCA’s coming into 
operation. Particular attention is given to whether there had to be actual 
receipt of the notice by the consumer in order to discharge the obligations 
placed on the credit provider. Focus is thereafter shifted to the manner in 
which default notices must be delivered in terms of article 19 of the 
Alienation of Land Act and section 129 of the NCA. We consider section 129 
of the NCA in its original as well as in its amended format as the section  
relates to the delivery of a default notice. Specific attention is given to 
whether the National Credit Amendment Act has indeed clarified the 
ambiguities, and the practical problems that have existed surrounding the 
delivery of default notices. Last, but not least, we consider Blue Chip 2 (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt,18 a recent Supreme Court of Appeal case, 
where despite the correct delivery of the default notice to the consumer, the 
                                            
15  See, eg Nedbank v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) in contrast with Absa Bank Ltd 
v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD); Balkind v Absa Bank 2013 2 SA 486 (ECG); and 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Van Vuuren, JG 2013 ZAGPJHC 16 (26 
February 2013.  
16  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC). 
17  See ss 129(5)(7) of the Act and the discussion in para 4 below.  
18  Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA). See the 
discussion in para 6 below. 
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notice caused unintended jurisdictional problems for a credit provider trying 
to enforce the credit agreement.  
2 Default notices in terms of previous consumer-credit 
legislation 
Prior to the implementation of section 129(1)(a) of the NCA there were other 
pieces of consumer-credit legislation which also placed a similar obligation 
on credit providers, namely to send default notices to defaulters 
(consumers). In some instances, credit providers were required to remind 
consumers of their outstanding debts and inform them of the possibility that 
they (the credit providers) could enforce their rights in terms of the 
agreement due to the consumers' default. 
The manner in which the default notices were dispatched to consumers in 
terms of the previous legislation differed. There were also varying 
interpretations regarding what constituted compliance with this obligation. It 
has been suggested that the manner in which these notices were sent in 
terms of the previous legislation plays a persuasive role in the proper 
interpretation of section 129 of NCA.19 
The repealed Hire-Purchase Act set out in section 12 the procedure that a 
credit provider had to follow in the event of a default by the consumer in 
terms of the credit agreement.20 Originally section 12(b) of the Hire-
Purchase Act stated that a written demand had to be made by the credit 
provider to the consumer by registered post, and there had to be a lapse of 
10 days before he could exercise certain remedies, such as claiming 
accelerated payment or damages, if the consumer did not rectify the breach. 
However, what constituted compliance with this obligation by the credit 
provider could not be ascertained from reading the Act. Therefore, the 
question arose of whether or not the consumer had actually to receive the 
notice. 
It was ruled in the case of Fitzgerald v Western Agencies21 that a notice sent 
out according to the manner stipulated in the Hire-Purchase Act, namely via 
registered mail, was valid. The credit grantor was considered to have 
discharged the obligation placed on him even if the notice which was sent 
by registered post did not reach the consumer. This decision was based on 
an amendment to the Hire-Purchase Act through the Hire-Purchase 
                                            
19  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained para 44.2.  
20  For a discussion see Taylor 2010 De Jure 106. 
21  Fitzgerald v Western Agencies 1968 1 SA 288 (T). 
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Amendment Act.22 The wording of section 12(b) of the Act was later 
amended and made a specific provision for the written demand to be either 
handed over to the consumer or sent by registered post to the consumer at 
his last known residential business address. 
The Credit Agreements Act replaced the Hire-Purchase Act. Section 11 of 
the Credit Agreements Act provided that a credit provider who wanted to 
claim return of the goods which may have been the subject-matter of the 
credit agreement had either to hand over the letter to the consumer and 
obtain a signed acknowledgement of receipt from the consumer, or 
alternatively to send a letter by prepaid registered mail to the credit receiver 
notifying him of his breach and giving him at least 30 days (or 14 days in 
limited circumstances) to respond. Section 11 thus made it compulsory for 
a letter to be sent to defaulting consumers in the event that the credit 
provider wanted to claim the return of the goods to which the credit 
agreement related. The Credit Agreements Act, unlike the NCA, did not 
state that a default notice had to be sent to the consumer by the credit 
provider as a prerequisite for his (the credit provider’s) claiming payment in 
terms of a contract and/or the credit provider’s enforcing the contract. It was 
sent only when the credit provider wanted to claim the return of the goods.23 
In Holme v Bardsley,24 a case dealing with a default notice that was sent in 
terms of the Alienation of Land Act (which is discussed in more detail 
below),25 it was held that notices under this Act must reach the purchaser. 
It has been submitted,26 however, that the decision in Holme v Bardsley was 
incorrect. In the case of Marques v Unibank Ltd,27 a notice was sent in terms 
of section 11 of the Credit Agreements Act, but the letter was returned 
marked "unclaimed". The court rejected the decision in Holme v Bardsley 
and decided that the notice in terms of the Credit Agreements Act did not 
necessarily have to come to the attention of the credit receiver consumer.28 
In interpreting how the notice in terms of the Credit Agreements Act should 
have been delivered, it has been suggested that section 7 of the 
Interpretation Act29 should have been considered.30 The effect of section 7 
of the Interpretation Act is that when a statute requires or authorises service 
                                            
22  Hire-Purchase Amendment Act 30 of 1965. 
23  See Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 119. 
24  Holme v Bardsley 1984 1 SA 429 (W). 
25  See the discussion in para 3 below. 
26  Otto "Consumer Credit" para 29(e). 
27  Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 1 SA 145 (W) 
28  Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 1 SA 145 (W) 155. 
29  Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 (hereafter the Interpretation Act.)  
30  See Otto "Consumer Credit" 61. 
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by post, a document which is contained in a registered letter, properly 
addressed and with the postage pre-paid, is deemed to have been served 
at the time that the letter is delivered in the ordinary course of postal 
business. This creates a presumption in favour of the credit provider for the 
purposes of section 11 of the Credit Agreements Act, in that all that is 
expected from the credit provider is to act reasonably to bring the notice to 
the credit receiver's attention. 
Van Niekerk v Favel31 was another case that looked at the delivery of 
notices in terms of the Alienation of Land Act. The judge in Van Niekerk v 
Favel supported the view expressed in Marques v Unibank Ltd, namely that 
the requirement for notification was satisfied if the letter was sent by 
registered post, irrespective of whether it was received by the intended 
recipient. 
The Usury Act of 192632 was repealed and replaced by the Limitation of 
Disclosure of Finance Charges Act of 1968.33 The latter Act underwent 
significant amendments and was later renamed the Usury Act of 1968. The 
Usury Act made no provision for the dispatch of a default notice as a 
prerequisite for claiming payment from defaulting consumers.34 This meant 
that the credit provider could claim performance any time after the payment 
of money (for instance, an instalment) had become due in terms of a 
mortgage agreement, for example, and he could even claim the whole 
amount outstanding in terms of the agreement based on an acceleration 
clause in the contract.35 
Section 13(1) of the repealed Sale of Land on Instalments Act provided that 
the credit provider had to either hand over a default letter to the consumer 
(the purchaser) and obtain an acknowledgment of receipt thereof or send it 
by registered post to the consumer's last known residential or business 
address. The section also inter alia provided that the credit provider had to 
inform the purchaser of his default. 
In Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd36 the court held that by virtue of the 
word "inform" (or "informed") in section 13(1) of the Sale of Land on 
Instalments Act, the notice had to reach the purchaser in order for it to be 
                                            
31  Van Niekerk v Favel 2006 4 SA 548 (W). 
32  Usury Act 37 of 1926. 
33  Limitation of Disclosure of Finance Charges Act 73 of 1968. 
34  See Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 119. 
35  See Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 119. 
36  Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 4 SA 123 (W). 
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considered effective.37 In the subsequent case of Maharaj v Tongaat 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd,38 Shearer J interpreted the word 
"inform" as being indicative of what the contents of the letter should be. It 
should inform the purchaser of the failure in question and make demand to 
the purchaser to remedy it. He concluded that the credit provider was 
regarded as having complied with his obligations at the time of posting the 
notice. It therefore did not have to actually reach the consumer. This matter 
was, however, taken on appeal.39 
On appeal, Wessels J compared the two methods of sending notices, as 
stipulated in the Sale of Land on Instalments Act.40 One method was 
handing the letter over to the purchaser and obtaining an acknowledgment 
of receipt thereof, and the second was sending it via registered post to the 
purchaser at his last known residential or business address. With regard to 
the first method, Wessels J concluded that the legislature's intention was to 
ensure that the letter was properly handed over, and this was confirmed by 
the fact that the effective handing over needed to be confirmed with a signed 
acknowledgement of receipt by the consumer.41 With regard to the second 
method, which was sending the notice by registered mail, he stated that the 
fact that the notice was to be sent to the consumer's last known address 
(and not domicilium) was so that it could reach the purchaser or, at least, 
be made available to him at an address where he was likely to be able to 
receive it.42 He therefore followed the earlier view expressed in Maron v 
Mulbarton Gardens, namely that in order to be effective, the notice had to 
reach the consumer. 
3  Default notices in terms of the current Alienation of Land 
Act 
The Alienation of Land Act repealed and replaced the Sale of Land on 
Instalments Act and is currently still in force. The Alienation of Land Act 
contains provisions relating to breach of contract by those involved in the 
sale and purchase of land. Certain contracts relating to the sale of land in 
instalments might also fall within the ambit of the NCA.43 In such a situation, 
both the Alienation of Land Act and the NCA are applicable. In this case, 
                                            
37  Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 4 SA 123 (W) 125D. 
38  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 314 (D) 318E. 
39  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 4 SA 994 (A). 
40  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 4 SA 994 (A) 999-1001. 
41  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 4 SA 994 (A) 1001. 
42  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 4 SA 994 (A) 1001. 
43  See Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation ch 20. 
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the seller of land (the credit provider) will have in addition to the 
requirements set out in the Alienation of Land Act also to comply with the 
notice and all other prerequisites set out in the NCA, for example by first 
sending the section 129 default notice stipulated in the NCA, if he wants to 
take legal action against the consumer (the purchaser).44 In the event of a 
conflict arising with regard to the applicability of these two Acts, Schedule 1 
of the NCA (read with section 172)45 indicates that the whole of the NCA will 
prevail to the extent of the conflict.46 Otto has analysed the interaction 
between the compulsory section 19 notice in terms of the Alienation of Land 
Act and the compulsory notice contemplated in terms of section 129 of the 
NCA.47 He is of the view that the two notices may be combined or could be 
sent separately, as the main aim of the two sections of the Acts is to ensure 
that the consumer is informed of his breach and is given the opportunity to 
rectify it. 
In the case of the Alienation of Land Act, just as in the previous consumer-
credit legislation discussed above, the same question arose, namely 
whether the default notice had to be received by the consumer for there to 
be compliance with section 19. Section 19 of the Alienation of Land Act 
regulates (and limits) the right of a seller (a credit provider) to take action in 
the event of a breach of a contract for the alienation of land. Section 19 of 
the Alienation of Land Act, prior to its being amended, provided that a credit 
provider first had to inform the consumer (the purchaser) of the breach of 
contract concerned. Provision was made for the notice either to be handed 
to the consumer or to be sent to him at his address by registered post. 
Holme v Bardsley48 was a case decided under section 19 of the Alienation 
of Land Act. In this case, two letters of demand purporting to be in 
compliance with section 19 were sent via registered mail to the consumer. 
One was sent to a post box and the other to a residential address. In 
determining whether there had been compliance on the part of the credit 
provider in this case, the court considered the objectives and tenor of the 
                                            
44  See, eg Armadien v The Registrar of Deeds and Wingerin 2017 2 All SA 431 (WCC). 
45  Section 172(1) of the NCA provides: "If there is a conflict between a provision of this 
Act mentioned in the first column of the table set out in Schedule 1, and a provision 
of another Act set out the second column of that table, the conflict must be resolved 
in accordance with the rule set out in the third column of that table." 
46  Also see Armadien v The Registrar of Deeds and Wingerin 2017 2 All SA 431 (WCC).  
47  Otto 2009 42 De Jure 166. In Armadien v The Registrar of Deeds and Wingerin 2017 
2 All SA 431 (WCC) the court stated that the "object of s 19 is plainly equivalent to 
that of s 129 read with s 130 of the NCA" (para 14). It also said that in the event of 
there being a conflict between s 19 of the Alienation of Land Act and s 129 of the 
NCA, s 129 would prevail (para 15). 
48  Holme v Bardsley 1984 1 SA 429 (W). 
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legislature in drafting section 19, and it stated that the section had been 
drafted to ensure the protection of the consumer, even though that might be 
prejudicial to the seller.49 The court therefore concluded that the fact that 
one of the letters had been returned "unclaimed" showed that it had never 
reached the consumer and that the consumer had therefore not been 
"informed", as required by the Act.50 
However, section 19 of the Alienation of Land Act was subsequently 
amended by the Alienation of Land Amendment Act of 1983.51 The latter 
Act inter alia deleted the word "informed" in section 19(1) and replaced it 
with the word "notified". In Van Niekerk v Favel52 the court confirmed that 
the requirement for notification in terms of section 19 is satisfied if the letter 
is sent by registered post, irrespective of whether or not it is received by the 
intended recipient (the consumer/purchaser). 
It has been correctly stated that replacing the word "informed" with "notified" 
in the Alienation of Land Act was an "attempt to make receipt of the notice 
unnecessary".53 It has also been argued54 that while the words "informed" 
and "notified" may appear to be synonymous, the difference lies in the fact 
that the word "inform" implies that the information reaches the mind of the 
person, while "notify" does not imply this. Notify means giving notice and 
does not necessarily mean that the contents of the notice have to come to 
the attention of the person to whom the notice is addressed.55  
4 The original section 129 (default) notice  
4.1 Conflicting interpretations of the delivery and receipt 
requirements of the section 129 notice in earlier case law 
Before section 129 of the NCA was amended by the National Credit 
Amendment Act in 2015, there was no indication from a plain reading of the 
section of whether the notice needed to actually come to the attention of the 
defaulting consumer or if it was sufficient for the notice merely to be 
dispatched in accordance with the Act. Furthermore, it was impossible to 
ascertain, by reading section 129 alone, how the default notice was to be 
                                            
49  Holme v Bardsley 1984 1 SA 429 (W) 431. 
50  Holme v Bardsley 1984 1 SA 429 (W) 432. 
51  Alienation of Land Amendment Act 51 of 1983. 
52  Van Niekerk v Favel 2006 4 SA 548 (W). Also see the discussion in para 2 above. 
53  Otto 2010 SA Merc LJ 597-598. 
54  Otto 2010 THRHR 138. 
55  Cloete J in Senatle v CEO of the South African Social Security Agency 2009 
ZANWHC 11 (30 April 2009) para 11. 
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delivered, as no method of delivery was provided for in this section. It was 
therefore initially necessary to look beyond section 129 to determine the 
intention of the legislature in this regard. The relevant sections of the NCA, 
which supposedly shed light on how the notice was to be delivered, were 
sections 65, 96 and 168. Regulation 1 of the 2006 Regulations,56 which 
defines the term "delivered", was also considered to be useful. 
The problematic issue of the delivery of the section 129(1)(a) notice and the 
question of whether such a notice had to be actually received by the 
consumer to constitute proper compliance with section 129(1) have been 
addressed in various cases since the inception of the NCA. In the beginning 
there were generally two schools of thought in this regard. One derived from 
the adoption of a strict and rigid approach, and the other from a more flexible 
approach. 
An example of the strict approach is found in the case of Absa Bank Ltd v 
Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors.57 Here the court did not address the 
meaning of "delivery" for the purposes of section 129(1)(a). However, the 
court did find that the use of the words "draw the default to the notice of the 
consumer", "providing notice" and "delivered a notice" in sections 129 and 
130 of the Act were clearly indicative of the fact that the credit provider was 
required to do more than merely dispatch the default notice to be in 
compliance with his statutory obligations.58 The court said that the credit 
provider was required to bring the default to the attention of the consumer 
in such a manner as to provide an assurance to the court, considering 
whether or not there had been proper compliance with the procedural 
requirements of sections 129 and 130, that the default had indeed been 
drawn "to the notice of the consumer".59 Unfortunately the court did not set 
out what practice was required of a credit provider in delivering a section 
129(1)(a) notice.60 By implication, the notice had to come to the attention of 
the consumer. In this case the court held that when a domicilium address 
was chosen by the consumer, the credit provider had to ensure that the 
address to which the section 129(1)(a) notice was sent was similar in every 
respect to the chosen domicilium address. The view that the notice actually 
                                            
56  Regulations published in GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006 (hereafter the 
Regulations). 
57  Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 2 SA 512 (D). For a 
discussion of this case, see Otto 2010 THRHR 136. 
58  Kelly Louw 2010 SA Merc LJ 580.  
59  Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 2 SA 512 (D) 524H.  
60  Kelly-Louw 2010 SA Merc LJ 581.  
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had to be received by the consumer was subsequently supported in a 
number of other judgments.61 
Other courts were more flexible and of the view that actual notification to the 
consumer was not a requirement, as long as the credit provider had sent 
the notice to the address given by the consumer. This more lenient view 
was best depicted in the case of Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd,62 where the court reached its decision by considering sections 65, 
96 and 168 of the NCA together with the definition of "delivered" in the 
Regulations. In supporting the view of the credit provider in the Munien 
case, the court held that while the manner of delivery was prescribed by the 
NCA, the method of delivery was set out in the Regulations. Since the 
Regulations state that a document is delivered if it is sent by one of the four 
methods set out in section 65(1) (by hand, mail, e-mail or fax) the court 
concluded that the section 129(1)(a) notice was therefore delivered if sent 
by registered post to the address chosen by the consumer, irrespective of 
whether or not it actually came to the attention of the consumer.63 This 
interpretation was supported and followed in number of other judgments.64 
The issue with the delivery of the notice eventually served before the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw and Another v FirstRand Bank Ltd.65 
The Supreme Court of Appeal followed an approach similar to that laid down 
in the Munien case (that is, the more flexible approach) – namely that 
delivery of the notice occurred when the notice was sent by registered post 
to the address chosen by the consumer, irrespective of whether the notice 
was actually received by the consumer. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal concentrated on section 65 of the NCA and held 
that sending the default notice by registered mail to the consumers' 
domicilium was one of the possible methods of delivery contemplated by 
that section. With regard to the interpretation of "delivered" in the 
Regulations, the court held that this definition was relevant only for the 
                                            
61  See, eg Firstrand Bank v Dlamini 2010 4 SA 531 (GNP); and Firstrand Bank Limited 
v Ngcobo 2009 ZAGPPHC 112 (11 September 2009). 
62  Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 549 (KZD). 
63  See Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 549 (KZD) para 12. 
See also Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 SA Merc LJ 48-49.  
64  See, eg, Firstrand Bank v Bernado 2009 ZAECPEHC 19 (28 April 2009); Standard 
Bank of South Africa v Mellet 2009 ZAFSHC 110 (30 October 2009); Starita v Absa 
Bank Ltd 2010 3 SA 443 (GSJ); Standard Bank of South Africa v Rockhill 2010 5 SA 
252 (GSJ); and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Maharaj t/a Sanrow Transport 
2010 5 SA 518 (KZP). 
65  Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). For a full discussion of this 
case, see Kelly-Louw 2010 SA Merc LJ 568; and Vlcek and Sithole 2010 Without 
Prejudice 32.  
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purpose of interpreting the different regulations dealing with the delivery of 
documents, and that it should not be used in interpreting sections 129(1)(a) 
and 130(1) of the NCA. Therefore, what constituted delivery had to be found 
by analysing the provisions of the Act itself, specifically sections 65, 96 and 
168.66 
The Supreme Court of Appeal explained67 that "send" meant to despatch by 
whichever means, but did not include the receipt of the sent item.68 The 
court emphasised the fact that where the consumer chose the manner in 
which to receive documents, the risk of non-receipt lay with the consumer, 
as it was within the consumer's own knowledge which means of 
communication would ensure that the document was delivered to him.69 
Therefore, actual receipt of the notice by the consumer was not a 
requirement. This was so, as long as the notice was sent to the chosen 
address (the domicilium address) set out in the credit agreement and the 
delivery method (for example, by registered mail) also selected by the 
consumer in the agreement was used.70 
4.2 The Constitutional Court's views 
During 2012 the controversial issue surrounding the delivery of the section 
129(1)(a) notice arose again, but this time before the Constitutional Court in 
Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.71 
In Sebola the credit provider sent out the section 129(1) notice via registered 
mail to the chosen post box address of the consumers.72 It was later 
discovered, however, that the notice had never reached the consumers, as 
the post office "track and trace" system showed that it had erroroneously 
been sent to another post office, a wrong one.73 
The court a quo74 held that it was not a requirement that the section 129(1) 
notice sent by the credit provider had to come to the actual attention of the 
consumer. However, the decision of the court a quo was delivered before 
                                            
66  See Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) paras 21-27.  
67  Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) paras 31-32.  
68  Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) para 30.  
69  Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) para 32. 
70  See Greeff v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2012 3 SA 157 (NCK), where the judgment by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in the Rossouw case was followed and applied.  
71  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC). For a discussion, 
see Eiselen "In the Wake of Sebola" 103-116. 
72  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 5. 
73  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 3.  
74  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa 2011 ZAGPJHC 229 (15 August 2011).  
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the judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw had been handed 
down. The court a quo granted the consumers leave to appeal its decision.75 
The consumers appealed to the full bench of the same court, which at that 
time believed that the decision handed down in Rossouw had settled the 
matter. The full court therefore held that it was not neccessary for the 
consumer to have the notice come to his actual attention, and on these 
grounds dismissed the appeal.76 The consumers thereafter approached the 
Constitutional Court in order for it to interpret section 129(1) of the NCA. 
Cameron J, who delivered the majority judgment, held that the NCA did not 
require the credit provider to prove that the default notice had actually come 
to the attention of the consumer or that it had been delivered to a specific 
address, as this would ordinarily be impossible to do. He added, that 
although it might be difficult for the credit provider to show that the notice 
came to the attention of the consumer, the credit provider had to make 
allegations that would satisfy the court from which enforcement was sought 
that the notice, on a balance of probabilities, had reached the consumer.77 
Therefore, where the notice was posted, mere despatch of it was not 
sufficient. Due to the risk of non-delivery by ordinary mail Cameron J 
emphasised that registered mail was essential, because though "registered 
letters may go astray, at least there is a high degree of probability that most 
of them are delivered."78 He added that even when a registered letter was 
sent there was a possibility that proof of registered despatch by itself was 
not enough. Thus, it was not sufficient for the credit provider to simply allege 
and provide proof that the notice had been sent by registered mail to the 
address chosen by the defaulting consumer. A credit provider also had to 
prove that the notice was received by the correct post office. Thus, the mere 
dispatch of a notice was not enough and at the very least, the credit provider 
"must obtain a post-despatch 'track and trace' print-out from the website of 
the South African Post Office" to show that the notice had been delivered to 
the relevant post office.79 If the notice reached the correct post office, in the 
absence of an indication to the contrary, a court could accept that there was 
adequate proof of delivery of the notice to the defaulting consumer.80 
Cameron J pointed out that if the consumer were to contend that he never 
actually received the notice, the court should establish "the truth of the 
                                            
75  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) paras 10 and 11.  
76  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) paras 12–14. 
77  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 74. 
78  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 75. 
79  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 76. 
80  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 86. 
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claim" and check if the credit provider had complied in terms of the Act.81 If 
the credit provider had not, then the matter had to be adjourned in terms of 
section 130(4)(b) of the NCA, in order for the credit provider to take the 
steps directed by the court to enable the consumer to exercise his rights.82 
At first, it appeared that the Constitutional Court's judgment in Sebola had 
ended the long-lasting debate regarding the delivery of the section 129 
notice. That view was short lived, as two different High Courts (that is the 
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town and the Kwazulu-Natal High Court, 
Durban) started interpreting and applying the Sebola judgment differently.83 
In both cases the credit providers had sent the section 129(1) notices by 
registered mail to the relevant post offices, and in both instances the notices 
had been returned to the credit providers as "uncollected". The respective 
High Courts gave conflicting judgments which again confused credit 
providers as to how they had to go about proving that they had complied 
with the obligations imposed by section 129(1) of the NCA in delivering a 
default notice to a consumer. 
In Nedbank Ltd v Binneman84 the credit provider obtained a track and trace 
report from the post office, as required in the Sebola case, proving that the 
section 129(1) notice had been sent by registered mail and had indeed 
reached the correct (relevant) post office. The consumer had not responded 
to the Post Office' notification to collect the registered item from the post 
office, so in reality the notice had not reached the consumer as it had been 
returned to the credit provider. 
The court (per Griesel J) held that mere proof that the section 129 notice 
had been sent by registered mail and proof that it had reached the correct 
(relevant) post office was enough to prove that the notice had been 
delivered. So, the fact that the notice had not been collected by the 
consumer from the post office was irrelevant. According to the court, the 
Constitutional Court in Sebola had not overruled the principle laid down by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw that the risk of non-receipt of the 
                                            
81  Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 87. 
82  Section 130(4)(b) provides that if the credit provider has not complied with the 
requirements of s 129 the court must adjourn the matter before it and make an 
appropriate order setting out the steps the credit provider must complete before the 
matter may be resumed. 
83  See Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC); and Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 
2012 5 SA 569 (WCC). For a discussion of these cases, see Van Heerden and 
Coetzee 2012 LitNet Akademies Regte; Fuchs 2013 PELJ 376; Fuchs 2014 THRHR 
217; and Eiselen "In the Wake of Sebola" 103-116. 
84  Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) paras 2 and 8. 
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notice was placed on the defaulting consumer.85 The consumer, who in 
terms of the NCA has the right to choose the address to which the notice 
must be delivered, should bear the risk of notices going astray. Therefore, 
all that the Sebola case had achieved, in Griesel J's view, was to clarify that 
despatch per se was insufficient, and that there also had to be proof that the 
notice had reached the correct post office.86 
The court acknowledged that it was not immediately clear what was meant 
by the phrase "in the absence of contrary indication", which had been used 
in the Sebola case, but held that for the purposes of the case before the 
court it was unnecessary to speculate as to its precise meaning.87 The 
evidence before the court proved that the notice had been sent by registered 
post to the agreed address and that the notice in reality reached the correct 
post office. Therefore, the credit provider had provided proper notice to the 
consumer as required by section 129, and the risk of non-receipt as a result 
rested squarely with the consumer.88 
A different interpretation of the Sebola judgment was given in the case of 
Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize.89 The court (per Olsen AJ) rejected the view 
adopted in the Binneman case that Sebola had not overruled the reasoning 
adopted in Rossouw. According to Olsen AJ the Sebola judgment had in 
fact overruled the reasoning adopted in Rossouw, and therefore the risk of 
non-receipt did not rest squarely with the consumer.90 
Olsen AJ referred to the majority judgment of Sebola in this judgment, and 
held that if there was conclusive evidence that the section 129 notice had 
not reached the consumer or the consumer's address, this was important 
and could not be ignored, as was seemingly suggested in the Rossouw and 
Binneman cases.91 According to Olsen J, the majority in Sebola could not 
have sanctioned a court’s ignoring evidence that the section 129 notice had 
not reached the consumer or his address. This is what would be required, 
in the cases before him, to conclude that compliance with section 129(1) 
had been proved.92 Therefore, Sebola was not merely a confirmation of 
Rossouw with added evidential requirements relating to proof. Sebola 
                                            
85  Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) para 6. 
86  Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) paras 4–6. 
87  Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) para 7. 
88  Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) para 8. The Binneman judgment 
was endorsed in Absa Bank Ltd v Petersen 2013 1 SA 481 (WCC). 
89  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD). 
90  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) para 58. 
91  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) para 51. 
92  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) para 51. 
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  18 
required proof that the notice had probably come to the attention of the 
consumer and did not endorse the decision in Rossouw that the risk of non-
delivery lies with the consumer.93 
Consequently, proof of delivery to the correct post office did not discharge 
the credit provider's duty to notify the consumer in terms of section 129 
where there was conclusive proof that the notice had not reached the 
consumer. The evidence before the court had to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the notice had reached the consumer.94 Olsen AJ 
concluded that due to the fact that the notices had not been collected by the 
respective consumers, there was non-compliance with section 129 (as 
decided in Sebola), and as a result the cases had to be adjourned, as 
contemplated by section 130(4)(b) of the NCA. The credit provider was 
ordered to resend the notices via registered mail, as well as all other 
available methods, in order to ensure that they were received by the 
consumer. 
The credit provider appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the 
judgment of Olsen AJ.95 The credit provider argued that the court a quo in 
Mkhize had interpreted Sebola incorrectly.96 The Supreme Court of Appeal, 
however, found that the order of the court a quo in Mkhize (that is, 
postponing the application for default judgment in terms of section 130 of 
the NCA) could not be appealed, as it was merely interlocutory or dilatory in 
nature. As the order of the court a quo was not definitive of the rights of the 
parties and still had to be dealt with, the Supreme Court of Appeal could not 
consider the substantive part of the credit provider's appeal and accordingly 
it dismissed the appeal. 
The issue of delivery of the section 129(1) notice came before the 
Constitutional Court for a second time in the case of Kubyana v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd.97 However, this time it was merely to clarify the 
same court's earlier decision expressed in Sebola. 
In Kubyana the section 129 notice was sent to the consumer's chosen 
domicilium by registered mail and the post office track and trace report 
confirmed delivery to the correct post office. There was also proof to the 
                                            
93  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) paras 50–58. This judgment was 
supported in Balkind v Absa Bank 2013 2 SA 486 (ECG) and Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd v Van Vuuren, JG 2013 ZAGPJHC 16 (26 February 2013). 
94  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) paras 55-56.  
95  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2014 5 SA 16 (SCA). 
96  Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2014 5 SA 16 (SCA) para 2. 
97  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC). 
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effect that two notices were sent to the consumer advising him that he had 
to fetch a document (that is, the section 129 notice) from the post office.98 
The consumer did not respond to either of these notices from the post office 
and as a result, the section 129 notice was returned to the credit provider 
marked by the post office as "uncollected". The court a quo99 held that the 
fact that the section 129 notice had been sent by registered mail to the 
address chosen by the consumer and reached the correct post office, which 
had sent two collection notifications to the consumer, meant that no further 
obligations were placed on the credit provider to use additional means to 
ensure that the consumer received the notice. Instead, the consumer had a 
duty to explain why the notices had not reached him, despite the attempts 
of the credit provider.100 
The matter then served before the Constitutional Court. It was essential for 
the Constitutional Court to clarify its earlier decision in Sebola, because the 
High Courts were interpreting and applying the Sebola decision 
differently.101 
The majority judgment (per Mhlantla AJ) held that the credit provider had 
shown that it had complied with the NCA by proving that the notice had been 
sent via registered mail to the correct post office. By doing this, the credit 
provider might credibly aver receipt of the notice by the consumer, and to 
require anything further from the credit provider would be too onerous and 
would allow consumers to ignore validly sent notices with impunity.102 
The Constitutional Court considered and agreed with the findings it had 
made in Sebola and those of the court a quo that there was no need for the 
credit provider to prove that the notice had come to the subjective attention 
of the consumer, nor was it a requirement that the notice be served 
personally on the consumer.103 In this respect, section 129 stipulated that 
the credit provider, after all, had to "draw the default to the notice of the 
consumer in writing". In the words of section 65(2) of the NCA, by making 
the document available to the consumer, in one of the methods set out in 
                                            
98  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 5.  
99  See Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Kubyana 2012 ZAGPPHC 259 (8 
November 2012). 
100  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 7 and 8. 
101  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 16-17. 
102  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 12.  
103  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 31 and 39. 
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the section, the credit provider discharges this obligation of having to draw 
the default notice to the attention of the consumer.104 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court confirmed its earlier view in Sebola 
that the postal service was an acceptable mode of delivery. The court 
quoted that part of the judgment in Sebola where it said that mere despatch 
did not suffice and the credit provider was required to furnish proof that 
reasonable measures had been taken to bring the notice to the attention of 
the consumer. While relying on Sebola, the court stated that when a 
consumer had elected to receive notices by way of post, the credit provider's 
obligation to deliver therefore generally consisted of (1) respecting the 
consumer's election; (2) undertaking the additional expense of sending 
notices by way of registered mail rather than ordinary mail; (3) ensuring that 
any notice was sent to the correct branch of the Post Office for the 
consumer's collection; and (4) obtaining proof that the Post Office issued a 
notification to the correct postal address of the consumer that a registered 
item was available for his collection.105 
The Constitutional Court again endorsed its view expressed in Sebola that 
a credit provider needed to take steps that would ensure that the notice was 
brought to the "attention of a reasonable consumer".106 According to the 
court, the credit provider indicated how he had complied with the obligations 
placed on him by the NCA. The credit provider had sent the section 129 
notice via registered mail to the branch of the Post Office nominated by the 
consumer, and the post office had sent two notifications to the consumer's 
designated address, indicating that an item was awaiting his collection. 
Despite these attempts by the credit provider, it had received no response 
from the consumer. The court held that if the consumer had unreasonably 
failed to respond to the section 129 notice, he would have eschewed 
reliance on the consensual dispute resolution mechanisms provided for by 
the NCA, and would subsequently, not be entitled to disrupt enforcement 
proceedings by claiming that the credit provider had failed to discharge its 
statutory notice obligations.107 So where the credit provider had complied 
with the requirements and received no response from the consumer within 
the period designated by the NCA, the court failed to see what more could 
                                            
104  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 31. 
105  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 32, 43 and 
54. 
106  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 33. The court 
in Sebola made references to the "reasonable consumer" (see Sebola v Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) paras 49 and 77). 
107  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 35.  
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be expected of the credit provider.108 For example, where a consumer has 
elected to receive notices by way of registered mail, he is duty bound to 
respond to notifications from the Post Office requesting him to collect 
registered items unless, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would 
not have responded. It was up to the consumer to show that the notice had 
not come to his attention and explain the reasons why it had not.109 The 
onus was thus on the consumer to explain why it could not reasonably be 
expected of him to have attended to the section 129 notice, if he wished to 
escape the consequences of that notice.110 
The Constitutional Court summarised the situation as follows:111 
Once a credit provider has produced the track and trace report indicating that 
the section 129 notice was sent to the correct branch of the Post Office and 
has shown that a notification was sent to the consumer by the Post Office, that 
credit provider will generally have shown that it has discharged its obligations 
under the Act to effect delivery. The credit provider is at that stage entitled to 
aver that it has done what is necessary to ensure that the notice reached the 
consumer. It then falls to the consumer to explain why it is not reasonable to 
expect the notice to have reached her attention if she wishes to escape the 
consequences of that notice. And it makes sense for the consumer to bear 
this burden of rebutting the inference of delivery, for the information regarding 
the reasonableness of her conduct generally lies solely within her knowledge. 
In the absence of such an explanation the credit provider's averment will 
stand. Put differently, even if there is evidence indicating that the section 129 
notice did not reach the consumer's attention, that will not amount to an 
indication disproving delivery if the reason for non-receipt is the consumer's 
unreasonable behaviour. 
The court set out the necessary steps that the credit provider needed to take 
in order to effect delivery and bring the notice to the attention of a 
reasonable consumer, where the consumer elected to receive the notices 
via post. Where delivery of the section 129 notice occurred through the 
postal service, proof that the credit provider had discharged its statutory 
obligations entailed proof by the credit provider that:112 
(a) the section 129 notice was sent via registered mail and was sent to the 
correct branch of the Post Office, in accordance with the postal address 
nominated by the consumer. This may be deduced from a track and 
trace report and the terms of the relevant credit agreement; 
(b)  the Post Office issued a notification to the consumer that a registered 
item was available for her collection; 
                                            
108  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 48.  
109  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 48. 
110  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 53. 
111  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 53. 
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(c) the Post Office's notification reached the consumer. This may be 
inferred from the fact that the Post Office sent the notification to the 
consumer's correct postal address, which inference may be rebutted by 
an indication to the contrary...; and 
(d) a reasonable consumer would have collected the section 129 notice 
and engaged with its contents. This may be inferred if the credit provider 
has proven (a)-(c), which inference may, again, be rebutted by a 
contrary indication: an explanation of why, in the circumstances, the 
notice would not have come to the attention of a reasonable consumer.  
The court in Kubyana concluded that the credit provider had complied with 
the above requirements. It could therefore reasonably be assumed that the 
notifications from the Post Office had reached the consumer. This was so, 
because the consumer never denied receiving the two notifications from the 
Post Office and he also never gave any explanation as to why he had not 
collected the document from the post office despite the notifications.113 
The Kubyana case resolved the uncertainty that was created by a few 
ambiguous statements made in the Sebola case.114 Kubyana provided 
clarification regarding what the credit provider needed to do to meet the 
obligations imposed by the NCA in respect of the delivery of the default 
notice. The case elucidated in particular what the scenario was if default 
notices were returned by the post office "unclaimed" or "uncollected" – a 
matter not settled in Sebola. In Kubyana the Constitutional Court explained 
its earlier decision in the Sebola case by making it evident that a credit 
provider needed only to submit evidence that it had provided a section 129 
notice to a consumer in such a manner that it could be expected to have 
reached the consumer. Thereafter, the onus of proof shifted to the 
consumer to prove that the notice, reasonably speaking, had not come to 
his attention.115 Furthermore, Kubyana confirmed that the Sebola judgment 
did not change the more objective approach taken by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Rossouw, where the court accentuated the responsibilities of the 
consumer (for instance, that the risk of non-receipt of the notice was placed 
on the defaulting consumer).116 However, after the Kubyana judgment had 
been delivered, certain amendments were made to section 129 of the NCA 
by the National Credit Amendment Act.  
                                            
113  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 55-58.  
114  See Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" 272. 
115  See Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" 269. See also Armadien v The Registrar of 
Deeds and Wingerin 2017 2 All SA 431 (WCC) where the court applied these two 
Constitutional Court judgments to determine whether or not the credit provider had 
properly delivered the s 129 notices.  
116  See Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" 272. 
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5  The amended section 129 (default) notice 
The National Credit Amendment Act was signed by the President on 16 May 
2014,117 but came into effect only on 13 March 2015. The National Credit 
Amendment Act amended section 129 of the NCA inter alia by adding three 
subsections to it. They provide as follow: 
(5)  The notice contemplated in subsection (1)(a) must be delivered to the 
consumer– 
(a)  by registered mail; or 
 (b)  to an adult person at the location designated by the consumer. 
(6)  The consumer must in writing indicate the preferred manner of delivery 
contemplated in subsection (5). 
(7)  Proof of delivery contemplated in subsection (5) is satisfied by– 
(a)  written confirmation by the postal service or its authorised agent, 
of delivery to the relevant post office or postal agency; or 
(b)   the signature or identifying mark of the recipient contemplated in 
subsection (5)(b). 
The three new subsections were drafted based on the Sebola judgment that 
was the prevailing authority at the time. The new subsections are in line with 
the interpretation adopted in the Sebola case. The subsections clarify the 
issue of the delivery of the section 129(1) notice to a defaulting consumer 
before the credit provider may institute legal proceedings against such a 
consumer. They make it clear that actual knowledge of the notice by the 
consumer is not required. The subsections provide for two methods of 
delivery (that is, per registered mail or delivery in person) of the default 
notice. They also set out how a credit provider should go about proving that 
he has complied with the obligations placed on him in terms of section 
129(1)(b) of the NCA. A consumer must specify, in writing, the manner in 
which he prefers the notice to be delivered to him. The subsections provide 
that proof of delivery of the notice must be recorded, so that no 
misunderstandings arise with regard to the receipt of the notice. Proof of 
delivery is satisfied, depending on the manner in which the notice is given 
to the consumer, if: (1) either the authorised agent of the postal service 
confirms in writing that the notice was delivered to the correct post office;118 
or (2) the recipient signs for the receipt of the notice.119 In either case, the 
                                            
117  GN 389 in GG 37665 of 19 May 2014. 
118  Section 129(7)(a) of the NCA. 
119  Section 129(7)(b) of the NCA. 
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credit provider does not have to prove that the notice came to the actual 
attention of the defaulting consumer. 
While the new subsections provide valuable guidance and much-needed 
clarification on the issue of the delivery of the section 129(1) notice, there 
are still some unresolved issues.120 For example, no mention is made of the 
situation where the credit provider sends a default notice per registered mail 
to the correct address of the consumer and it reaches the correct post office, 
which then duly notifies the consumer to fetch the registered letter but, for 
whatever reason, the consumer neglects to fetch the notice. At the time the 
Kubyana judgment dealing with this specific issue was delivered the 
National Credit Amendment Act had already been drafted (but was not in 
operation yet) and the Kubyana judgment was therefore not taken into 
consideration during the drafting of the amendments. The Kubyana case121 
stipulated that where the credit provider had complied with all the 
requirements for delivery described above, there was nothing further that 
could be required from the credit provider, and the defaulting consumer 
would therefore bear the onus of proving that the notice had not come to his 
attention, and would have to provide reasons for this. However, the lack of 
explicit direction from the legislature as to what the situation would be if the 
consumer did not fetch the notice, despite the credit provider’s having 
complied with all its notification obligations in section 129, has the potential 
to again create confusion. For instance, one could interpret this to mean that 
it is the intention of the legislature with the National Credit Amendment Act 
that mere proof of receipt by the correct post office is sufficient and will 
constitute compliance, despite indications that the notice was not received. 
However, in our view the Kubyana judgment still governs the situation where 
default notices are not collected by consumers. 
6 A few comments 
It is evident, from these court cases, particularly the lengthy judgments 
handed down by the Constitutional Court in the Sebola and Kubyana cases, 
that the decisions pertaining to the proper interpretation of the delivery of 
the section 129(1)(a) notice were influenced by a multiplicity of factors. One 
of the factors considered by many of the courts was the previous consumer-
credit legislation, which contained similar provisions for the delivery of 
default notices. The previous consumer-credit legislation generally made 
provision for two methods by which the default notices could be delivered 
                                            
120  Also see Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 123. 
121  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) paras 35-36.  
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to consumers, namely by hand or registered mail.122 The repealed Usury 
Act and the repealed Credit Agreements Act did not require that the credit 
provider send a demand to a defaulting consumer before being able to claim 
payment in terms of the contract. The Credit Agreements Act did, however, 
require that the credit provider send a default notice if he wanted to claim 
the return of the goods. The previous consumer-credit legislation, except for 
the Sale of Land on Instalments Act, did not require that the default notice 
actually come to the attention of the consumer. The Alienation of Land Act, 
which is still in operation, also provides for a default notice to be sent to a 
consumer using one of the two aforementioned methods and does not 
require that the notice come to the actual attention of the consumer.123 
Another factor considered by many of the courts when they interpreted the 
delivery of the section 129(1)(a) notice was the purposes of the NCA. The 
courts emphasised the need to ensure that the objectives of the Act were 
met, by striking a balance between the rights of the consumer and those of 
the credit provider. This was especially important as the NCA is generally 
more focused on the protection of the consumer than that of the credit 
provider.124 
After considering all these and other factors, the Constitutional Court in 
Sebola set out what was required from the credit provider where he sent the 
section 129 notice per registered mail. It emphasised that the credit provider 
had to produce a track and trace printout from the Post Office indicating that 
the notice had reached the correct post office. Unfortunately, the court in 
Sebola neglected to consider or pronounce on the rather obvious possibility 
that while the track and trace printout from the Post Office would indicate 
that the notice had been delivered to the correct post office there could also 
be an indication that the notice had not been collected by the consumer and 
was thus being returned as "unclaimed" to the credit provider. Fortunately 
this issue was addressed and settled by the Constitutional Court in 
Kubyana. The Kubyana judgment, like the Rossouw judgment, emphasises 
the reciprocal duty of care required by both the credit provider and the 
consumer in order to achieve the objectives set out in the NCA. The 
Kubyana case not only specified what was required of the credit provider to 
fulfil his obligations in terms of the NCA, but also what was required of a 
defaulting consumer. 
                                            
122  See the discussion in para 2 above. 
123  See the discussion in para 3 above. 
124  See, eg, Mostert v Firstrand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank 2018 4 SA 443 (SCA) para 
24. 
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Sections 129(5) to (7) of the NCA now prescribe the two acceptable 
methods for delivering the section 129(1)(a) notice. Provision is made for 
the default notice to be delivered to consumers either by hand to an adult 
person at the location designated by the consumer, or by registered mail. 
No other methods of delivery of the notice are permitted. With the 
amendments to section 129, the issue of delivery of the default notice in 
terms of the NCA is now more aligned with what previous consumer-credit 
legislation stipulated as being the two methods of delivering their respective 
default notices. Although it is to be welcomed that the National Credit 
Amendment Act has resolved the issue of what the methods of delivery of 
the section 129 notice are, it is a pity that the legislature failed to take today’s 
technological advancements into account when it set out the two methods 
of delivery. 
With society and businesses moving away from paper-based 
communication, it would be interesting to learn how many consumers still 
have physical post boxes. In a country like South Africa, where the postal 
service have been plagued in recent years by various employee strikes,125 
one cannot help but wonder whether this old-fashioned method of delivery 
should still receive such preference today. These strikes by postal workers 
caused various businesses to move away from relying on the Post Office 
and instead to relying on electronic forms of communication with their 
consumers. The legislature, sadly, has also not endorsed other methods of 
delivering default notifications, such as sms (short message service) or e-
mail (electronic mail) notifications. For instance, a section 129 notice could 
easily be brought to the attention of a consumer in the form of a sms that 
provides a unique hyperlink to that consumer's section 129 notice.126 This 
notice might even be accessed and read on the mobile phone itself. 
Moreover, proof of delivery of the sms (or the fact that the consumer clicked 
on a particular hyperlink) could be provided by the network operators. 
Another means of bringing the default notice to the attention of the 
consumer and of proving that the notice most likely came to the attention of 
the consumer is to ensure that e-mails sent are tagged with a read receipt. 
In this way, the credit provider would be able to show that the e-mail was 
indeed opened and, in all likelihood, must have come to the attention of the 
consumer. Whilst these technologically advanced means of delivering 
notices have not been included in the National Credit Amendment Act, it is 
noteworthy that the Randburg Magistrates' Court in two recent cases 
                                            
125  Madlopha 2017 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/post-offices-cwu-
members-vow-to-protest-until-demands-are-met-20170928. 
126  For a similar view, see Eiselen "In the Wake of Sebola" 116.  
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regarded "digital letters of demand" as being similar in status to 
conventional registered post,127 and so as complying with the provisions of 
the NCA. It is unclear whether other courts, particularly High Courts, would 
follow suit. Should they do so, this would probably necessitate the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s having to make a definite ruling in this regard. However, 
based on a pure and strict reading of the current provisions of section 129 
of the NCA, it appears unlikely that the provisions also include these means 
of delivering the default notices. Although we regret this flaw in the 
Amendment Act, we cannot simply read into the NCA that which we should 
like to see there, when it is not. 
Section 129 now not only provides for the consumer to specify – in writing 
– the manner in which a notification of a default should be delivered, but 
also indicates what would constitute proof of delivery so that no 
disagreements can arise. It is specifically stated that proof of delivery is 
satisfied by written confirmation by the postal service or its authorised agent 
of delivery to the relevant post office or postal agency or by the signature or 
identifying mark of the recipient. Regrettably the legislature neglected to 
consider the situation where, despite confirmation by the postal service that 
the notice was sent to the correct post office and that subsequent 
notifications were sent to the consumer, the consumer, for whatever reason, 
nevertheless failed to collect the default notice. In other words, the situation 
where there is evidence that the consumer did not receive the notice. The 
amended section 129 does not require that the consumer must actually 
receive the notice. It simply states when it will be deemed that it was 
delivered, but neglects to deal with the situation where there is proof that 
the consumer did not receive the notice. Therefore, it is our view that the 
Kubyana judgment will still govern such a situation and should be read in 
conjunction with section 129. This means that if the credit provider can show 
that he properly delivered the notice via registered mail and in compliance 
with section 129, there is nothing further that can be required from the credit 
provider. The consumer who tries to dispute compliance by the credit 
provider in such an instance will have to adduce evidence to show why the 
notice never reached him (eg he was hospitalised during that period, or out 
of the country), despite the attempts of the credit provider to notify him of 
his default. Should the consumer not be able to furnish reasons that are 
acceptable to the court as to why he never fetched or received the notice, it 
                                            
127  Witness Reporter Witness 3; Colling 2018 http://www.polity.org.za/article/court-
finds-registered-digital-communication-carries-same-weight-as-its-traditional-
predecessor-2018-05-30. 
 
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  28 
will be to his own detriment. Thus, the Kubyana judgment is still relevant 
and complementary to section 129. 
The Kubyana and Sebola cases consequently are not outdated. These 
cases still provide valuable authority for matters not dealt with or settled by 
the National Credit Amendment Act and should be read in conjunction with 
the amended section 129.128 
Although most issues regarding the delivery of a section 129(1)(a) notice 
have now been resolved, a completely new issue relating to the notice 
recently arose in Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt.129 In 
this case the credit provider (the appellant) had entered into an unsecured 
credit agreement governed by the NCA with the consumer (the respondent). 
The credit agreement had been entered into in Bloemfontein and in terms 
of the agreement the monthly repayments were to be made into the credit 
provider's bank account in Bloemfontein. The consumer defaulted on his 
repayments in terms of the agreement and the credit provider sent a section 
129 notice via registered mail to the consumer's domicilium citandi et 
executandi, which was in Kimberly. The consumer failed to respond to the 
notice and the credit provider sent another letter of demand, but this time in 
terms of section 56 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944.130 It appears 
that the second letter of demand was hand delivered to the consumer in 
Kimberley. To this letter the consumer responded by giving written consent 
in Bloemfontein to judgment in respect of the debt, and the interest and 
costs, in terms of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
However, when the credit provider applied for judgment in the Bloemfontein 
Magistrates' Court, the magistrate dealing with the matter refused to grant 
judgment. Reliance was placed on section 28(1)(d) of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act, which states that one of the grounds upon which jurisdiction may 
be found is by the fact that the whole cause of action arose within the 
jurisdiction of that court. The magistrate held that delivery of the section 129 
notice was an element of the cause of action and consequently, since 
delivery of the letter had taken place in Kimberly, the Bloemfontein 
Magistrates' Court lacked jurisdiction, as the whole cause of action did not 
arise within the jurisdiction of that court.131 
                                            
128  See Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" 272. 
129  Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA). 
130  Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 (hereafter the Magistrates' Court Act). 
131  Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA) para 5. 
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The matter then went on appeal before the Free State High Court, 
Bloemfontein. On appeal, the court held that the delivery of the section 129 
notice "does not form part of the cause of action", but that it "completed the 
cause of action".132 Therefore, the delivery of the notice gave rise to 
jurisdiction and since the section 129 notice had not been delivered in 
Bloemfontein, the Bloemfontein Magistrates' Court lacked jurisdiction to 
deal with the matter. 
The matter then came before the Supreme Court of Appeal and the issue 
that needed to be decided was whether delivery of the section 129 notice 
constituted part of the cause of action. The credit provider argued that while 
delivery of the section 129 notice had to be claimed and proved, it was a 
procedural step that did not form part of the cause of action and 
consequently did not have any bearing on section 28(1)(d) of the 
Magistrates' Court Act. The credit provider argued that the cause of action 
was manifested when the agreement, having been entered into in 
Bloemfontein, was breached in Bloemfontein and this was sufficient to found 
the jurisdiction of the Bloemfontein Magistrates' Court.133 
The Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed. It considered the definition of 
cause of action. It held that in the event that a statute stipulates that a notice 
must be given prior to commencing action, then the giving of that notice is 
essential to the successful pursuit of that claim, and proving that notice was 
given formed part of the cause of action.134 
The court considered the purpose of the NCA and the importance of the 
delivery of the section 129(1)(a) notice as emphasised in Sebola and 
Kubyana. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that it was essential that a 
creditor aver compliance with section 129 of the NCA in order for it to 
disclose a cause of action resulting from default under a credit agreement. 
Should the creditor fail to make such averment, the summons would be 
rendered excipiable.135 
The court concluded that the giving of the section 129 notice was critical to 
founding jurisdiction as contemplated in section 28(1)(d) of the Magistrates' 
Court Act. As the delivery of the notice in this case took place outside the 
jurisdiction of the Bloemfontein Magistrates' Court, the cause of action did 
not arise "wholly within the district or regional division" of that court and the 
                                            
132  Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA) para 6.  
133  Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA) para 7. 
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Bloemfontein Magistrates' Court therefore lacked jurisdiction.136 The appeal 
was accordingly dismissed. 
Although the judgment in Blue Chip is probably correct, it will not solve the 
practical difficulties this judgment creates. The scenario that presented itself 
in Blue Chip is not unique and will in all likelihood present itself often. As a 
consumer is permitted to choose any address to which the section 129 
notice should be delivered, similar problems regarding jurisdiction will 
constantly arise in practice. In terms of section 129(5) the notice must be 
sent by registered mail or be delivered to an adult person at the location 
designated by the consumer. The credit provider is compelled to use the 
address selected by the consumer and cannot decide to use another 
address of the consumer.137 For instance, where the notice was sent to an 
incorrect address a court is forced to set aside a default judgment.138 
There are various problems and different opinions regarding the exact 
jurisdiction of a magistrates' court and a high court for the purposes of the 
enforcement of a credit agreement and the consents to jurisdictions in terms 
of section 90(2)(k)(vi) of the NCA.139 Due to the uncertainty, credit providers 
might have limited options to prevent jurisdiction problems similar to those 
that arose in Blue Chip. Matters relating to jurisdiction for the purposes of 
the enforcement of a credit agreement are, of course, made worse by the 
fact that the NCA does not contain any specific provision dealing with 
jurisdiction in respect of the person of the consumer. Accordingly, it has 
been suggested that the provisions relating to jurisdiction in respect of the 
person of a defendant as set out in section 28(1) of the Magistrates' Court 
Act should be applicable where a magistrates' court is approached.140 
Section 90(2)(k)(vi) dealing with consents to jurisdiction in the NCA in 
essence aims to prevent forum shopping141 by the credit provider and  high 
legal costs for the consumer. For instance, by forcing a credit provider to 
use the court closest to where the consumer resides or works, or litigating 
                                            
136  Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA) para 21. 
137  See Greeff v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2012 3 SA 157 (NCK). 
138  See Kgomo v Standard Bankof South Africa 2016 2 SA 184 (GP); and Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained 120. 
139  For a discussion of the problematic aspects of this section, see Kelly-Louw 
"Consumer Credit" para 86 in endnotes 33 and 34 at 162-163; Scholtz et al National 
Credit Act paras 9.3.3 and 12.3; and Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained in 
footnotes 60 and 61 at 59-60. 
140  Scholtz et al National Credit Act para 12.3. 
141  Nedbank Ltd v Mateman; Nedbank Ltd v Stringer 2008 4 SA 276 (T). 
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in the magistrates' court instead of the High Court.142 Particularly relevant 
to the discussions herein is section 90(2)(k)(vi)(bb) of the NCA, which 
specifies that a provision of a credit agreement is unlawful if it expresses, 
on behalf of the consumer, a consent to the jurisdiction of any court seated 
outside the area of jurisdiction of a court having concurrent jurisdiction and 
in which the consumer resides or works or where the goods in question (if 
any) are ordinarily kept. Section 90(2)(k)(vi)(bb) is considered to restrict the 
credit provider to the court in whose area the consumer works or lives, or 
where the goods are kept/located.143 Roestoff and Coetzee state that the 
purpose of this section is to oust the jurisdiction of the court, including the 
High Court, not closest in distance to the consumer's residence, or the 
consumer’s place of work, or the place where the goods are kept.144 Otto 
points out that if this interpretation is correct, it would appear that a "well-
known ground of jurisdiction contained in s 28(1)(d) of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 32 of 1944 may not be agreed upon."145 Otto states that section 
90(2)(k)(vi)(bb) therefore forbids provisions in agreements expressing 
consent to jurisdiction on any ground other than the residence or 
employment of the consumer or the location of the goods. However, 
according to him, the section does not exclude jurisdiction by operation of 
law, by means of the provisions of section 28(1)(d) of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act. Otto remarks that this was "probably not the (subjective) 
intention of the legislature, particularly when one considers how provisions 
regarding jurisdiction were formulated in previous legislation."146 He refers 
specifically to section 21 of the repealed Credit Agreements Act, which 
contained a provision to the effect that the application of section 28(1)(d) of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act was excluded in respect of credit agreements 
governed by the Credit Agreements Act, unless the credit receiver no longer 
resided in South Africa. The NCA has no similar provision and it has been 
said that this seemingly entails that the prohibition against basing 
jurisdiction for the purposes of the enforcement of a credit agreement on the 
fact that the cause of action wholly arose within the district of a specific 
magistrates court does not apply to credit agreements governed by the 
NCA.147 
                                            
142  See Absa Bank Ltd v Myburgh 2009 3 SA 340 (T); and Absa Bank Ltd v Pretorius 
2008 JOL 21209 (T). 
143  See Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" para 86 in endnotes 33 and 34 at 162-163; and 
Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained in footnote 61 at 59-60. 
144  See Roestoff and Coetzee 2008 THRHR 678; and for the expression of a similar 
view see Van Heerden 2008 TSAR 840. 
145  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained in footnote 61 at 59-60. 
146  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained in footnote 61 at 60. 
147  Scholtz et al National Credit Act para 12.13 at 12-114(2). 
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Be that as it may, if a consumer has elected a specific address for the 
delivery of the section 129 notice, the credit provider will have no choice but 
to comply with the election. This is so, even if the address selected by the 
consumer is not necessarily his residential or employment address or the 
address where the goods are located. This could lead to a situation where 
credit providers will start limiting consumers' free choice to select an 
address for the delivery of section 129 notices, to avoid later jurisdictional 
problems. The section 129 notice serves many different purposes in terms 
of the NCA. Its purposes are not only to notify the consumer of his 
outstanding arrears, or to start the debt collection process, but also, 
extremely importantly, to inform the consumer of the possible assistance 
that is available before legal action will be instituted. 
In Kubyana the Constitutional Court stressed that "an appropriate balance 
between the competing interests of both parties to a credit agreement" 
should be struck when sections 129 and 130 of the NCA are applied, 
because the "offer of credit is crucial to the economy" of South Africa.148 We 
are not convinced that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Blue Chip truly 
balanced the rights of the credit provider with those of the consumer or 
interpreted this aspect of section 129 in a manner that gives effect to the 
purposes of the NCA149 as section 2(1) of the NCA dictates. The effect of 
the Blue Chip judgment might indeed thwart the intentions of Part C of 
Chapter 6 of the NCA. The NCA is very resolute to ensure that the debt 
collecting procedure set out in Part C of Chapter 6 of the Act is followed by 
credit providers, and it goes so far as to state that where there is a conflict 
between sections 57 and 58 of the Magistrates' Court Act and inter alia 
sections 129 and 131 (ie, repossession of goods) of the NCA, the listed 
sections of the NCA will prevail.150 
The Courts of Law Amendment Act,151 currently awaiting an incorporation 
date, will amend the Magistrates' Court Act significantly. For instance, the 
Courts of Law Amendment Act will insert a subsection (3) into section 45 of 
the Magistrates' Court Act, which will read that 
[a]ny consent given in proceedings instituted in terms of section 57, 58, 65 or 
65J by a defendant or a judgment debtor to the jurisdiction of a court which 
                                            
148  Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) para 89. 
149  Set out in s 3 of the NCA. 
150  See s 172(1) read with Schedule 1 to the NCA. 
151  Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017 (see GN 769 in GG 41017 of 2 August 
2017 (assented to on 31 July 2017; and commencement to be proclaimed)). 
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does not have jurisdiction over that defendant or judgment debtor in terms of 
section 28, is of no force and effect. 
The Courts of Law Amendment Act will also amend sections 57 and 58 of 
the Magistrates' Court Act substantially and will provide inter alia that the 
provisions of both these sections will apply, subject to the relevant 
provisions of the NCA, where either the application or request for judgment 
is based on a credit agreement under the NCA.152 The NCA clearly states 
that where there is a conflict between Chapter IX (i.e. provisions dealing 
with the execution of judgment debts) of the Magistrates' Court Act and inter 
alia sections 127, 129 and 131 of the NCA, the listed sections of the latter 
Act will prevail.153 
It is doubted whether the legislature would have intended to negatively 
affect a credit provider in this manner for merely delivering the section 129 
notice to the chosen address of the consumer, as he is required to do in 
terms of the NCA. 
It would be welcomed if the legislature could also bring section 129 in line 
with the Kubyana judgment and end the prevailing ambiguities that still 
persist surrounding the delivery of the notice. If any future Amendment Act 
could also offer guidance on how to deal with the practical jurisdictional 
problem that arose in the Blue Chip case, it would simplify matters even 
more. Unfortunately, it is clear from a reading of the recent National Credit 
Amendment Bill of 2018154 that these aspects are not receiving the 
necessary attention from the legislature. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Eiselen "In the Wake of Sebola" 
Eiselen S "In the Wake of Sebola" in Visser C and Pretorius JT (eds) Essays 
in Honour of Frans Malan (LexisNexis Durban 2014) 103-116 
                                            
152  See ss 57(5) and 58(3) to be inserted into the Magistrates' Court Act by the Courts 
of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017. 
153  See s 172(1) read with Schedule 1 to the NCA. 
154  The Draft National Credit Amendment Bill, 2018 was published in Gen N 922 in GG 
41274 of 24 November 2017. Public hearings were held on the draft Bill during 
January 2018 and some amendments followed which resulted in the National Credit 
Amendment Bill 30 of 2018. The Bill was approved by the National Assembly on 12 
September 2018 and has been transmitted to the National Council of Provinces for 
concurrence (see Sabinet 2018 http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/economic-
affairs/legislation/national-credit-amendment-2018).  
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  34 
Fuchs 2013 PELJ  
Fuchs MM "The Impact of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 on the 
Enforcement of a Mortgage Bond: Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC)" 2010 PELJ 377-392 
Fuchs 2014 THRHR  
Fuchs MM "Regsposisie Indien 'n Artikel 129(1)(a)-kennisgewing Ingevolge 
die National Credit Act 34 van 2005 nie die Verbandskuldenaar Bereik het 
nie" 2014 THRHR 217-230 
Govender Interpretation of the Section 129(1)(a) Notice 
Govender S The Interpretation of the Section 129(1)(a) Notice of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 According to Case Law (LLM-dissertation 
UNISA 2015) 
Kelly-Louw 2010 SA Merc LJ  
Kelly-Louw M "The Default Notice as Required by the National Credit Act 
34 of 2005" 2010 SA Merc LJ 568-594 
Kelly-Louw Consumer Credit Regulation  
Kelly-Louw M Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 
2012) 
Kelly-Louw "Consumer Credit" 
Kelly-Louw M "Consumer Credit" in Joubert WA and Faris JA (eds) The Law 
of South Africa 3rd ed (LexisNexis Durban 2014) Vol 8 
Kelly-Louw 2015 SALJ  
Kelly-Louw M "The Overcomplicated Interpretation of the Word 'May' in 
Sections 129 and 123 of the National Credit Act" 2015 SALJ 245-257 
Otto "Consumer Credit" 
Otto JM "Consumer Credit" in Joubert WA, Faris JA and Harms LTC (eds) 
The Law of South Africa 2nd ed (LexisNexis Durban 2004) 1-214 
Otto 2009 De Jure  
Otto JM "Aanmanings by Afbetalingsverkoopkontrakte van Grond en die 
National Credit Act" 2009 De Jure 166-174 
Otto 2010 THRHR  
Otto JM "Kennisgewings kragtens National Credit Act: Moet die Verbruiker 
Dit Ontvang? — Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 
(2) SA 512 (D)" 2010 THRHR 136-144  
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  35 
Otto 2010 SA Merc LJ  
Otto JM "Notices in Terms of the National Credit Act: Wholesale National 
Confusion. Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors; Munien v 
BMW Financial Services; Starita v Absa Bank Ltd; FirstRand Bank Ltd v 
Dhlamini" 2010 SA Merc LJ 595-607 
Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 
Otto JM and Otto R-L The National Credit Act Explained 4th ed (Lexis Nexis 
Durban 2016)  
Roestoff and Coetzee 2008 THRHR 
Roestoff M and Coetzee H "Consent to Jurisdiction – Unlawful Provision in 
a Credit Agreement in terms of the National Credit Act – is the Jurisdiction 
of a Court Ousted thereby" 2008 THRHR 678-688 
Scholtz et al National Credit Act 
Scholtz JW et al Guide to the National Credit Act (LexisNexis Durban 2008) 
(loose-leaf) 
Taylor 2010 De Jure  
Taylor H "Enforcement of Debt in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005, Trial and Celebration? A Critical Evaluation" 2010 De Jure 103-119 
Van Heerden 2008 TSAR 
Van Heerden CM "Perspectives on Jurisdiction in terms of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005" 2008 TSAR 840-855 
Van Heerden and Boraine 2011 SA Merc LJ  
Van Heerden CM and Boraine A "The Conundrum of Non-compulsory 
Notice in terms of Section 129(1)(a) of the National Credit Act" 2011 SA 
Merc LJ 45-63 
Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 LitNet Akademies Regte 
Van Heerden C and Coetzee H "Artikel 129(1)(a) van die Nasionale 
Kredietwet 34 van 2005: Verwarrende Verwarring oor Voldoening" 2012 
LitNet Akademies Regte 254-297 
Vlcek and Sithole 2010 Without Prejudice  
Vlcek D and Sithole P "NCA Enforcement Notices – The Final Word" 
December 2010 Without Prejudice 32-33 
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  36 
Witness Reporter Witness  
Witness Reporter "Judgments Set Precedent to Allow Digital Debt Letters" 
Witness (4 June 2018) 3 
Case law 
Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) 
Absa Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2014 5 SA 16 (SCA) 
Absa Bank Ltd v Myburgh 2009 3 SA 340 (T) 
Absa Bank Ltd v Petersen 2013 1 SA 481 (WCC) 
Absa Bank Ltd v Pretorius 2008 JOL 21209 (T) 
Absa Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 2 SA 512 (D) 
Armadien v The Registrar of Deeds and Wingerin 2017 2 All SA 431 (WCC) 
Balkind v Absa Bank 2013 2 SA 486 (ECG) 
Blue Chip 2 (Pty) Ltd t/a Blue Chip 49 v Ryneveldt 2016 6 SA 102 (SCA) 
Firstrand Bank v Bernado 2009 ZAECPEHC 19 (28 April 2009) 
Firstrand Bank Limited v Dhlamini 2010 4 SA 531 (GNP) 
Firstrand Bank Limited v Ngcobo 2009 ZAGPPHC 112 (11 September 
2009) 
First National Bank Ltd v Rossouw (GNP) (unreported) case number 
30624/2009 of 6 August 2009 
Fitzgerald v Western Agencies 1968 1 SA 288 (T) 
Greeff v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2012 3 SA 157 (NCK) 
Griekwaland-Wes Korporatief Limited v Jacobs (NCK) (unreported) case 
number 1995/2010 of 5 August 2011 
Holme v Bardsley 1984 1 SA 429 (W) 
Imperial Bank v Kubheka 2010 JDR 0077 (GNP) 
Kgomo v Standard Bankof South Africa 2016 2 SA 184 (GP) 
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  37 
Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2014 3 SA 56 (CC) 
Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 314 (D) 
Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 4 SA 994 (A) 
Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 4 SA 123 (W) 
Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 1 SA 145 (W) 
Moegemat v Nedbank Ltd (ECG) (unreported) case number CA39/2010 of 
27 October 2010  
Mostert v Firstrand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank 2018 4 SA 443 (SCA) 
Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 549 (KZD) 
Nedbank Limited v Mokhonoana 2010 5 SA 551 (GNP)  
Nedbank Ltd v Binneman 2012 5 SA 569 (WCC) 
Nedbank Ltd v Mateman; Nedbank Ltd v Stringer 2008 4 SA 276 (T) 
Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) 
Rossouw v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA)  
Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa 2011 ZAGPJHC 229 (15 August 
2011) 
Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) 
Senatle v CEO of the South African Social Security Agency 2009 ZANWHC 
11 (30 April 2009) 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Kubyana 2012 ZAGPPHC 259 (8 
November 2012) 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Mellet 2009 ZAFSHC 110 (30 October 
2009) 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Rockhill 2010 5 SA 252 (GSJ)  
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Maharaj t/a Sanrow Transport 2010 5 
SA 518 (KZP) 
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  38 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Van Vuuren 2009 5 SA 557 (T) 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Van Vuuren, JG 2013 ZAGPJHC 16 
(26 February 2013 
Starita v Absa Bank Ltd 2010 3 SA 443 (GSJ) 
Van Niekerk v Favel 2006 4 SA 548 (W) 
Legislation 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 
Alienation of Land Amendment Act 51 of 1983 
Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017 
Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 
Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942 
Hire-Purchase Amendment Act 30 of 1965 
Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 
Limitation of Disclosure of Finance Charges Act 73 of 1968 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 
National Credit Act 35 of 2005  
National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014  
Sale of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971 
Usury Act 37 of 1926 
Usury Act 73 of 1968 
Government publications 
GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006  
GN 389 in GG 37665 of 19 May 2014 
GN 769 in GG 41017 of 2 August 2017 
S GOVENDER & M KELLY-LOUW  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  39 
Gen N 922 in GG 41274 of 24 November 2017 
Internet sources 
Colling 2018 http://www.polity.org.za/article/court-finds-registered-digital-
communication-carries-same-weight-as-its-traditional-predecessor-2018-
05-30 
Colling N 2018 Court Finds Registered Digital Communication Carries 
Same Weight as its Traditional Predecessor http://www.polity. 
org.za/article/court-finds-registered-digital-communication-carries-same-
weight-as-its-traditional-predecessor-2018-05-30 accessed 4 June 2018 
Madlopha 2017 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/post-offices-
cwu-members-vow-to-protest-until-demands-are-met-20170928 
Madlopha V 2017 Post Office's CWU Members Vow to Protest until 
Demands are met https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/post-offices-
cwu-members-vow-to-protest-until-demands-are-met-20170928 accessed 
4 September 2018 
Sabinet 2018 http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/economic-affairs/legislation/ 
national-credit-amendment-2018 
Sabinet 2018 National Credit Amendment 2018 http://www.sabinet 
law.co.za/economic-affairs/legislation/national-credit-amendment-2018 
accessed 17 September 2018 
List of Abbreviations 
NCA National Credit Act 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SA Merc LJ South African Mercantile Law Journal 
THRHR Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
 
 
 
